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The Direct Impact of Disparate Impact Claims on 
Banks 
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest challenges in the fight to eliminate 
discriminatory lending practices is proving that a party intended to create 
a racial imbalance or to discriminate against a protected class.1  Proving 
intent is especially tricky because it is mistakenly assumed that in the 
absence of overt discrimination a bank’s racial composition of customers 
would mirror that of society.2  Indeed, many racial imbalances in society 
today are created unintentionally.3  So, the question must be posed—is it 
the duty of the judiciary to police unintentional discrimination?  In the 
summer of 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court answered this question in Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project.4  The Court held that the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) recognizes 
disparate impact claims and that the Texas Department of Housing’s 
distribution of FHA tax credits was done in a way that led to unintentional 
discrimination.5 
Even though Inclusive Communities did not directly involve 
lenders, its holding could significantly impact lenders in two ways.  First, 
disparate impact claims may now be brought against lenders under an 
additional provision of the FHA.6  Second, this ruling could allow 
disparate impact claims to be brought in other fair lending causes of 
action such as those brought under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
1. Nikole Hannah-Jones, How the Supreme Court Could Scuttle Critical Fair Housing
Rule, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-supreme-
court-could-scuttle-critical-fair-housing-rule. 
2. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2530 (2015) (discussing the difficulty of proving intent for a discrimination claim). 
3. Lauren Kirchner, What Happens When Biases Are Inadvertently Baked Into
Algorithms, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 9, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/discrimination-algorithms-disparate-
impact/403969/. 
4. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2550.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part II (arguing that disparate impact claims could be brought under 42
U.S.C. § 3605). 
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(“ECOA”).7  As a result, these expansions to discrimination claims 
against lenders could have a major impact on future bank litigation.8  
Facially neutral lending practices that impact classes in a statistically 
disproportionate way could unintentionally violate the FHA.9  From the 
perspective of equal housing advocates, on the other hand, this ruling is 
a victory in fighting discrimination through the FHA because of the 
broadened recognition of disparate impact claims.10 
Both the majority and dissent in Inclusive Communities expressed 
concerns that the Court’s holding could lead to abuse and ultimately 
undermine the FHA’s goal of eliminating discrimination and improving 
lending options for minority borrowers.11  In order to combat these 
concerns, the Court placed a number of limitations on disparate impact 
claims.12  These limitations are favorable to the defendant of an FHA 
claim, because they have tightened the requirements for a plaintiff’s 
prima facie case and loosened the standards for the business necessity 
rebuttal.13  Without this high burden of proof at the pleading stage, there 
could be a sizable increase in disparate impact claims against lenders, 
resulting in increased litigation costs.14  The threat of litigation and the 
accompanying expenses could force lenders to rely on racial statistics and 
unintentionally create quotas in hopes of avoiding litigation.15  
Furthermore, the use of quotas or racial considerations in lending 
decisions brings about a number of constitutional questions.16 
This Note will explain the importance of these limitations set 
7. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2014).
8. See infra Part III (discussing how disparate impact claims could result into increased
litigation costs for banks). 
9. See Joe Adler, Supreme Court Backs ‘Disparate Impact’ Theory in Texas Case, AM.
BANKER 2015 (discussing the ABA’s argument that disparate impact theory is not the correct 
way to achieve fairness and prevent discrimination in lending practices). 
10. Id.
11. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. (explaining that a low burden of proof at the pleading stage could lead to an
increase in litigation costs); Christopher Roach, Supreme Court Takes on Housing 
Discrimination, JDSUPRA BUS. (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/supreme-
court-takes-on-housing-49737/. 
15. Bankers to Obama: Stop ‘Abusing’ Disparate Impact Charges, INVESTORS (Aug. 18, 
2015, 6:36 PM), http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/081815-767118-bankers-group-
demands-obama-regulators-revise-disparate-impact-standards.htm; Roach, supra note 14. 
16. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (explaining that the use of racial
consideration in lending decisions could be unconstitutional). 
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forth in Inclusive Communities and how this decision will impact banks.17  
Part II of this Note discusses the history and evolution of disparate impact 
theory and how the rationale used in Inclusive Communities could have a 
major impact on lenders.18  Part III explains the limitations embedded in 
this ruling and how they may help mitigate many lenders’ concerns of 
unintentional FHA violations.19  Part IV reviews the most recent disparate 
impact cases and how these limitations are being applied in courts 
today.20  Lastly, Part V offers recommendations for banks to avoid 
potential liability from disparate impact claims under the FHA.21 
II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND THE HISTORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT
Lenders are most likely to unintentionally violate the FHA under 
42 U.S.C. § 3605.22  The central purpose of this provision is to eradicate 
discriminatory practices in any “real estate-related transaction.”23 The 
statute states that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose 
business includes engaging in real estate-related 
transaction to discriminate against any person in making 
available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions 
of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status, or national origin.24 
In Inclusive Communities, the Court found that the statutory 
language of §§ 3601-361925 of the FHA required a results-oriented 
approach where the consequences of the action should be examined 
instead of the actor’s intent.26  This was the same conclusion found in 
17. See infra Part III & IV.
18. See infra notes 19–52 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
22. Lenders would most likely violate this provision because of its focus on real estate
related transactions.  For example, when a lender provides the funding to purchase a house, 
he would be subject to this provision.  See 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2013). 
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2013).
26. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
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both Griggs v. Duke Power Co.27 and Smith v. City of Jackson,28 where 
the Court discussed disparate impact under both Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (“ADEA”).29  Both of these cases also held that when the statutory 
language refers to the consequences of actions and not just to the mindset 
of the actors, the statute should be read to encompass disparate impact 
claims.30  This precedent provided the support needed to conclude that 
the FHA encompasses disparate impact claims.31 
The standard for employment discrimination disparate impact 
claims was established in Griggs, which allowed claims for statistical 
disparities with very few limitations.32  This standard was then 
substantially limited in Wards Cover Packing Co. v. Atonio,33 as the 
Court required the plaintiff to point to a specific policy or practice that 
caused the discriminatory effect and allowed the defendant to raise the 
defense of business necessity.34  While Congress later expanded that 
standard for Title VII claims when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
the standard for claims under the ADEA has remained consistent with the 
standard set forth in Wards Cover Packing Co.35  The narrowest standard 
yet, however, was adopted in Inclusive Communities for FHA claims, as 
it requires everything needed for an ADEA claim36 but also tightens the 
requirements for a prima facie case and broadens the business necessity 
defense.37  This updated standard could help protect lenders from 
disparate impact claims brought under the FHA because of the difficulty 
2507, 2510 (2015). 
27. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
28. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
29. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2516–17 (discussing the court’s reasoning in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and Smith v. City of Jackson). 
30. Id. at 2518.
31. See id. at 2522–23 (concluding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under
FHA). 
32. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
33. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
34. Id. at 650.
35. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
36. See Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 656 (requiring the plaintiff to point to a
specific policy that caused the discriminatory effect in order to meet the prima facie burden). 
37. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (increasing the burden on the plaintiff in bringing a prima facie case 
and expanding the defendant’s ability to use the business necessity defense through additional 
limitations. The business necessity defense allows a defendant to defend their practice by 
arguing that the practice is necessary for a valid business reason). 
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a plaintiff is faced with in proving that a specific policy or practice caused 
the discriminatory impact.38 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) has the responsibility 
of interpreting and enforcing the FHA and has the power to issue relevant 
FHA regulations.39  In 2013, the Secretary of HUD issued a regulation 
interpreting the FHA to encompass disparate impact liability.40  Along 
with formalizing the long-held recognition of disparate impact claims in 
this regulation, HUD also created a universal test, the “Burden Shifting 
Test,”41 for determining whether a practice has an unjustified 
discriminatory effect.42 
The Burden Shifting Test first requires the plaintiff to make a 
prima facie showing of disparate impact by exhibiting a specific policy 
or practice that has caused a discriminatory effect.43  This is different than 
proving that the defendant intended to discriminate, as it only requires the 
plaintiff to show that a policy resulted in a discriminatory effect.44  If the 
plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case for disparate impact, the 
burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that the practice or policy is 
necessary to achieve one or more substantial and legitimate 
nondiscriminatory interests.45  If the defendant is able to meet this 
standard, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the interests 
served by the practice could be achieved by another practice with a less 
discriminatory effect.46  The Burden Shifting Test places a high initial 
burden on the plaintiff and allows the defendant to defend its identified 
practice.47  In Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court adopted the 
38. Paul Hancock & Andrew Glass, Symposium: The Supreme Court Recognizes But
Limits Disparate Impact in its Fair Housing Act Decision, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2015, 
8:58 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/paul-hancock-fha/. 
39. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg.  11460, 11460 (2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
40. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2514 (2015) (adopting this standard from the ADEA’s standard for disparate impact 
claims and from Wards Cove Packing Co.). 
41. The name of the test comes from the fact that once a party meets their burden the
burden then “shifts” to the other party.  Id. 
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2513.
45. Id. at 2515.
46. Id.
47. See Bankers to Obama: Stop ‘Abusing’ Disparate Impact Charges, supra note 15
(discussing the importance of a high burden on disparate impact claims). 
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Burden Shifting Test and used it to determine if a specific practice or 
policy violated the FHA.48 
This decision set the standard for claims arising under 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 3601–3619,49 but could very likely be expanded to claims under 42
U.S.C. § 3605, which deals specifically with real estate-related
transactions.50  As lenders who are engaging in real estate-related
transactions would be subject to § 3605 of the FHA, the standard for
disparate impact claims is very important moving forward.51  Inclusive
Communities made a strong articulation of the FHA’s purpose, scope, and
structure and that interpretation may be invoked in future cases involving
other unresolved interpretations of the FHA.52  The Court in Inclusive
Communities argued that the wording “otherwise make unavailable” in
§§ 3601–3619 requires a results-oriented approach, although these words
are not found in the statutory language of § 3605.53  It follows that
disparate impact claims may not be allowed under § 3605.54  As discussed
in Part IV, in City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co.,55 the Court said
disparate impact claims are permitted to be heard under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3605.56  Thus, if disparate impact claims are allowed to be heard under
42 U.S.C. § 3605, the most likely standard would be the one established
in Inclusive Communities.
Another way this decision could have an impact on banks is if it 
is construed to allow disparate impact claims to be brought under other 
fair lending causes of actions.  The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”) is already doing so and has argued for some time now 
that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ECOA in an effort 
48. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514–15.
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2013).
50. Id. at § 3605.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2013).
52. Mark C. Fang & Jay C. Carlisle II, Administrative Estoppel and the Fair Housing
Act, N.Y.U L. REV. (Dec. 10, 2015), 
http://www.newyorkjournal.com/id=1202744461224/Administrative-Estoppel-and-the-Fair 
-Housing-Act?slreturn=20151122113255.
53. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2510.
54. Since the statutory language of § 3605 does not include “otherwise make
unavailable,” it does not require the results-oriented approach.  Since § 3605 does not require 
the results-oriented approach, disparate impact claims would not be cognizable under the 
statute.  Id. 
55. City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:13-cv-09007-ODW(RZx), 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93451 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015). 
56. See id. at *1.
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to challenge discriminatory practices in the auto lending industry.57  
Inclusive Communities could help bolster the CFPB’s argument that 
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ECOA, but the decision 
could also create new limits if the same standard is applied.58 
III. THE LIMITATIONS ON DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS
Although the U.S. Supreme Court held that disparate impact 
claims were cognizable under the FHA, it spent the majority of its 
analysis focusing on the importance of limitations and the proper way to 
ensure that these claims were not abused.59  It warned that if these 
limitations were not properly applied, disparate impact liability could 
undermine any benefit provided to minority low-income borrowers for 
fear of liability.60  In order to limit the abuse of disparate impact claims, 
the Court established the following limitations as guiding steps in the 
evaluation process: (1) claims for disparate impact should be examined 
with care at the pleading stage;61 (2) plaintiffs must identify a specific 
policy of the defendants that has caused the discriminatory effect;62 (3) 
policies being challenged under disparate impact theory must create an 
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barrier to the protected class in order 
for it to meet the prima facie burden;63 (4) defendants must be allowed to 
explain the valid interests served by their practices;64 and (5) remedial 
orders for liability under the disparate impact theory must concentrate on 
the elimination of the offending practice through “race neutral” means 
57. The House of Representatives passed a bill to nullify CFPB Bulletin 2013-02 dealing
with the use of disparate impact against auto lenders.  See H.R. 1737, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015). 
The CFPB has been widely criticized for irresponsibly bringing disparate impact claims 
without proper support.  Id.  The Senate has received the bill and it has been read twice but 
there has been no action yet.  Id. 
58. See id. (suggesting that since Inclusive Communities held that disparate impact
claims are cognizable under the FHA, they may also be cognizable under the ECOA but these 
claims are subject to a number of limitations in order to avoid abuse). 
59. Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
60. Id.
61. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (examining with care at the pleading stage is used to tighten the 
requirements for a prima facie case by allowing the court to enforce a higher burden on the 
plaintiff). 
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2524.
64. Id. at 2518.
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instead of punitive measures.65  These limitations were put in place to 
narrow the application of disparate impact claims in hopes of avoiding 
abusive claims and the creation of quotas.66 
A. Courts Should Examine Disparate Impact Claims with Care at
the Pleading Stage In Order to Deter Excessive Litigation Costs
Assuming this decision applies to lenders through other 
provisions of the FHA or other fair lending causes of actions, the 
limitations placed on disparate impact claims may actually benefit 
lenders.  The threat of disparate impact claims is nothing new to most 
lenders because the majority of courts have allowed its use and the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and CFPB have consistently brought 
disparate impact claims under the FHA and ECOA.67  So, even though 
lenders took a hit with the Court’s finding that disparate impact was 
cognizable under the FHA, the narrow standard applied in Inclusive 
Communities could actually improve a banking lender’s ability to defend 
themselves. 
Lenders will be concerned with the likely increase in litigation 
costs that may result from an increase in disparate impact claims.68  The 
DOJ and CFPB have already have used disparate impact theory and have 
been awarded hundreds of millions dollars from lenders.69  These 
increased litigation costs may push cost-conscious lenders to settle weak 
claims instead of risking greater losses through litigation.70  Further, the 
expenses will force lenders to make changes to their current lending 
65. Id. at 2524.
66. Id. at 2523; see also Hancock & Glass, supra note 38 (showing the potential abuse
that can result without the proper limitations). 
67. See Bankers to Obama: Stop ‘Abusing’ Disparate Impact Charges, supra note 15;
Rachel Witkowski, CFPB Overestimates Potential Discrimination, AM. BANKER, Sept. 17, 
2015 (discussing how for the past few years, mortgage lenders have been sued under disparate 
impact theory for racial bias based on no evidence but racial statistics). 
68. Roach, supra note 14.
69. Greg Stohr, Insurers Disappointed as Supreme Court Back Disparate Impact
Claims, INS. J. (2015), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2015/06/25/373004.htm. 
70. Ed Mannino, Supreme Court Holds That Disparate Impact Claims Can Be Brought
Under The Fair Housing Act, ED MANNINO BLOG (June 25, 2015), 
http://edmannino.com/blog/supreme-court-holds-that-disparate-impact-claims-can-be-
brought-under-the-fair-housing-act/. 
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practices by minimizing litigation or risk.71 
Justice Alito pointed out that Inclusive Communities creates a 
standard that will inevitably force lenders to turn away more minority 
applicants because lenders will turn to more strict criteria in order to 
avoid violating the FHA.72  These increased costs might push lenders into 
shrinking their operation in order to reduce the risk of litigation, likely 
hurting the people the disparate impact claims aim to protect.73  To 
combat this uncertainty, lenders will most likely “either create cookie-
cutter loans with rigid criteria” or completely remove certain credit 
products for which the financial risk of litigation outweighs the expected 
revenue.74  These adjustments will ultimately hurt the consumer who 
would no longer be able to receive traditional loans under strengthened 
criteria.75 
Another possible result of the increased litigation and the 
associated costs would be lenders unintentionally moving towards 
numerical quotas or considering race as a factor when making lending 
decisions.76  This unforeseen result would raise new constitutional issues 
and could make race a primary consideration, which may increase 
discrimination rather than mitigate it.77  These practices could potentially 
violate the Equal Protection Clause (“EPC”), as the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly said that the use of racial quotas is unconstitutional.78  Lenders 
would be forced to balance making profit-driven decisions and the threat 
of unintentionally violating either the FHA or the EPC.79  This 
cost/benefit analysis would create an unfair burden on lenders and 
71. Adler, supra note 9.
72. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2532 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that this decision would actually hurt 
the very people it is attempting to protect); Mannino, supra note 70. 
73. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting).
74. Letter from Independent Bankers Association of Texas President and CEO
Christopher L. Williston to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (Jan. 17, 
2012) (on file with author) (letter expressing the comments of IBAT about the HUD proposed 
Regulation that was passed in 2013). 
75. Id.
76. Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
77. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2551 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court
recognizes by allowing these claims, lenders would inevitably make race a primary 
consideration in order to avoid potential liability and yet they still find that these claims are 
cognizable under the FHA). 
78. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
79. Roach, supra note 14.
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introduce new factors to the credit underwriting process unrelated to the 
borrower’s credit-worthiness or ability to pay the loan.80 
The risk of hurting minority low-income borrowers and the use 
of racial quotas in lending decisions can best be minimized by careful 
examination of a plaintiff’s prima facie case at the pleading stage.81  
Disparate impact claims brought under the FHA or other fair lending 
causes of action should not be interpreted so broadly that findings of 
disparate impact liability forces racial considerations to be injected into 
every decision.82  The requirement of careful examination at the pleading 
stage empowers courts to come to a “prompt resolution to these cases”83 
by dismissing frivolous claims early on in the process thereby minimizing 
the cost of litigation for the defendant.84  Lenders must be given the 
latitude and the freedom to make necessary business decisions without 
the threat of violating the FHA lurking around every corner.85  This 
careful examination makes it tougher for a plaintiff to meet the 
requirements for a prima facie disparate impact claim and should help 
lenders have weaker claims dismissed at the pleading stage. 
B. Plaintiffs Have the Burden of Proving a Specific Practice Has
Caused a Discriminatory Effect
Before Inclusive Communities, courts still required the plaintiff 
to identify a specific practice that caused the discriminatory effect to for 
disparate impact claims in order to help deter frivolous or abusive 
claims.86  This is particularly important when considering the recent 
concerns about the CFPB’s methods of bringing disparate impact claims 
based on faulty statistics.87 
80. Christopher Allen et al., Don’t Discount Disparate Impact After High Court Case,
LAW360 (June 25, 2015), https://lawlibproxy2.unc.edu:2147/articles/674225/don-t-discount-
disparate-impact-after-high-court-case. 
81. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522.
82. Allen et al., supra note 80.
83. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522 (stressing the importance of these claims to
be resolved quickly in order to minimize the costs on the defendant). 
84. Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
85. Bankers to Obama: Stop ‘Abusing’ Disparate Impact Charges, supra note 15.
86. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (requiring a plaintiff
to point to a specific policy or practice when bringing a disparate impact claim under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act). 
87. See Jennifer L. Gray, House of Representatives Vote to Repeal CFPB’s Auto Lending
Guidance and Issues Scathing Report on CFPB’s Methodology and Statistics,  NAT’L L. REV.
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A second major concern for lenders is the risk of being found 
liable for racial imbalances that they did not create.88  Racial imbalances 
may have many causes and lenders could be unfairly victimized if forced 
to accept liability for imbalances beyond their control.89  This risk is 
particularly worrisome because of the ease of disparate impact claims in 
finding an inadvertent bias in a seemingly neutral practice.90  The 
American Bankers Association (“ABA”) expressed the same concern in 
stating that “[d]own-payment requirements, debt-to-income 
requirements, loan-to-value requirements and other neutral, risk-based 
underwriting requirements can all affect various racial and ethnic groups 
differently.”91  Showing a racial imbalance from a facially neutral price 
model is not difficult because these inadvertent biases can be caused by 
almost anything.92 
The Inclusive Communities Court addressed this concern by 
placing two burdens on the plaintiff.93  The first requirement is pointing 
to a specific policy of the defendant; the second is the burden of proving 
that that policy actually caused the discriminatory impact.94  Both 
burdens can be very tough for a plaintiff to meet because of the number 
of factors that go into lending decisions and the number of sources that 
can cause a racial imbalance.95 
The requirement that a plaintiff point to a defendant’s specific 
policy ultimately helps to protect lenders, as a plaintiff’s pleading that 
merely notes a statistical disparity will be quickly dismissed.96  It is very 
(Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/house-representatives-votes-to-repeal-
cfpb-s-auto-lending-guidance-and-issues (criticizing the CFPB for knowingly using faulty 
statistics to bring disparate impact claims against auto lenders). 
88. See Allen, supra note 80 (pointing out that the robust causality requirement protects
defendants from being held liable for imbalances they did not create). 
89. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–24; Adler, supra note 9.
90. Kirchner, supra note 3.
91. Brief for the ABA at 14, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2014) (No. 13-1371), 2014 WL 2796302, at 14; Mannino, supra 
note 70. 
92. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2530 (Justice Alito arguing that racial imbalances
are everywhere in society, have existed throughout history, and can be caused by almost 
anything); See Kirchner, supra note 3 (analyzing the Princeton Review’s pricing for online 
SAT tutoring showed a racial imbalance that resulted from a neutral geographical pricing 
method). 
93. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514.
94. Id.
95. Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
96. Id.
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difficult to prove the actual cause of a racial imbalance and the pleading 
standard should, in principal, help eliminate any liability for racial 
imbalances that lenders did not create.97  However, while the two burdens 
should assist defendants in weeding out the most unmeritorious claims, 
they do not completely eliminate the threat that lenders will be found 
liable for racial imbalances they did not create.98 
The two requirements should also help dismiss claims that arise 
from inconsistent or faulty statistics, like in some of CFPB’s recent cases, 
because of the difficulty the causation requirement creates.99 This 
heightened standard should present a challenge to plaintiffs who choose 
to bring claims with invalid support. 
C. Policy Must Create an Artificial, Arbitrary, and Unnecessary
Barrier in Order to Violate the FHA
Disparate impact claims may be used as a powerful incentive to 
force a lender’s hand in certain business decisions and invalidate 
profitable and fair policies.100  Moving forward, lenders will need to state 
and explain why their practice or policy supports a valid interest in order 
to maintain a credit-based lending system.101  Overbroad application of 
these claims may cause lenders to make unprofitable business decisions 
in the hopes of avoiding liability.102  When the fear of unintentionally 
violating the FHA is greater than the desire to make a higher profit, the 
effect of disparate impact precedent may exceed its intended scope.103  
Lenders will substitute profit considerations with racial considerations, 
which could result in completely eliminating certain high-risk lending 
97. Id.
98. Mannino, supra note 70.
99. See H.R. 1737, 114th Cong. (2015) (criticizing the CFPB’s use of fault statistics
when bringing disparate impact claims against the auto lending industry). 
100. Allen, supra note 80.
101. Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
102. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2510 (2015); See id (arguing that overbroad application of these claims could 
undermine the purpose of the FHA as well as the free-market system). 
103. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (suggesting that “if the specter of disparate-
impact litigation causes private developers to no longer construct or renovate housing units 
for low-income individuals, then the FHA would have undermined its own purpose” and that 
this would also be the case if the specter of disparate impact litigation caused lenders to no 
longer lend to low-income individuals in order to better protect themselves from liability). 
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practices.104  Some of these scrapped practices provide beneficial access 
to capital for low-income minority borrowers and the loss could be 
detrimental to the very borrowers these disparate impact claims are trying 
to protect.105 
To combat the fear of excluding low-income borrowers, the 
Inclusive Communities Court expanded the use of the business necessity 
defense so that only practices or policies that create an artificial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary barrier to capital or a loan are liable under the FHA 
through disparate impact theory.106  When policies or practices 
discriminate against a protected class, they create barriers to fair 
treatment of that class when attempting to get a loan. However, certain 
prohibited behaviors may be necessary for continuing operations, and 
thus, should be encouraged as long as they are for a valid purpose.107  
Barriers created for unnecessary or artificial reasons and are not 
necessary to the success of the business are the primary target of disparate 
impact claims.108  For example, a bank’s policy of allowing lower interest 
rates based on the borrower’s credit score should be permissible, because 
the interest rate coincides with the chances of repayment and is necessary 
for a lender to successfully run its business.  On the other hand, a policy 
that takes into consideration where someone lives to determine an interest 
rate should not be allowed, because it is impermissible for determining 
the probability of repayment.  This shows the purpose of the decision is 
to remove the intent barrier to thwart unintentional racial discrimination 
but only when the policy fails to serve a legitimate purpose or business 
need.109 
This limitation leaves intact lenders’ policies that serve legitimate 
business goals and will permit some leeway for making necessary 
business decisions.  This is achieved by both lessening the requirements 
104. See id. (arguing that over broad application of these claims could lead to an
undermining of the free-market system and racial considerations being used in making 
business decisions). 
105. See City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:13-cv-09007-ODW(RZx),
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93451, at *33 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) (criticizing plaintiffs for 
choosing to attack a policy that benefits low-income minority borrowers); Adler, supra note 
9 (discussing ABA’s argument that these claims will inevitably result in lenders to shrink 
operations). 
106. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522.
107. Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
108. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
109. See id.
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of the business necessity defense and refocusing claims on policies that 
have created barriers for unnecessary reasons.110  This added burden is a 
strong weapon in defending legitimate business practices or policies that 
lead to a statistical disparity. 
D. Defendants Must Be Allowed to Explain the Legitimate Purpose
a Policy or Practice Serves
One concern of lenders is that certain policies with legitimate 
business purposes will be criticized as creating racial barriers.111  While 
a policy may seem to create an artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary 
barrier to receiving a loan or interest rate, it may actually serve a 
legitimate business purpose. These claims may force lenders to move to 
policies that consider race over objective credit risk factors or destroy 
legitimate business practices that were determined to have violated the 
FHA, even though someone or something else could have caused the 
racial imbalance.112  Courts will not have the same knowledge and 
understanding of the banking industry as the businesses at stake.113  
Policies or practices that serve legitimate purposes may be found to 
violate the FHA because that purpose is not properly understood. Thus, 
these claims run the risk of punishing defendants for unintentional 
behavior without permitting them to defend the legitimate interest of the 
policy or practice.114 
To prevent the elimination of legitimate business practices, the 
Court adopted the “Burden Shifting Test,” which allows defendants to 
explain the purpose of a challenged practice or policy.115  If the defendant 
meets this requirement, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show 
110. Id. at 2522.
111. Hancock & Glass, supra note 38.
112. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524; Adler, supra note 9.
113. See Ari Karen, How Disparate Impact Ruling Affects Lenders’ Daily Operations,
NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (July 6, 2015), 
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/compliance-regulation/how-disparate-impact-
ruling-affects-lenders-daily-operations-1055261-1.html (assuming that bankers have a better 
understanding of the lending industry to make practical business decisions than the court, and 
thus recommending the regular analysis of lending practices by lending entities). 
114. See Kirchner, supra note 3 (“Because disparate impact theory is results-oriented, it
would seem to be a good way to challenge algorithmic bias in court. A plaintiff would only 
need to demonstrate bias in the results, without having to prove that a program was conceived 
with bias as its goal.”). 
115. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2514.
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that there is a less discriminatory way of achieving the goal than the 
current policy or practice.116  Using this test supports the Court’s 
reasoning that the FHA is only supposed to remove barriers to renting, 
buying, or securing financing for housing in three instances: (1) when 
they create a discriminatory effect, (2) when the barrier does not serve a 
legitimate purpose, or (3) when it serves a legitimate purpose but there is 
a less discriminatory way to achieve that purpose.117  This test allows 
lenders to defend and explain the legitimate business purpose of a policy 
or practice, and again, loosens the requirements for asserting the business 
necessity defense. 
E. Remedial Orders Must Concentrate on the Elimination of the
Offending Practice through “Race Neutral” Means Instead of
Punitive Measures
Lenders should also be concerned about the expensive judicial 
awards for disparate impact liability.118  The Court suggests that the 
purpose of allowing FHA disparate impact claims is to eliminate practices 
that have unintentionally discriminated against a protected minority class, 
not to punish the actors that have unintentionally discriminated.119  As 
discussed above, lenders will likely face increased litigation costs after 
Inclusive Communities, but punitive damages could be even more costly 
and burdensome.120  These judgments are particularly concerning 
because they would penalize banks or lenders who had no intention of 
discriminating, and in some cases, no knowledge of the discriminatory 
impact.121 
To help serve the purpose of the Inclusive Communities ruling 
116. Id.
117. Jess Davis, Justices Uphold Broad Reading of Bias in Housing Law, LAW360 (June
25, 2015), https://lawlibproxy2.unc.edu:2147/articles/629024/justices-uphold-broad-reading-
of-bias-in-housing-law. 
118. See Bankers to Obama: Stop ‘Abusing’ Disparate Impact Charges, supra note 15
(pointing out the 1.2 billion dollar shakedown of the banking industry using disparate impact 
theory). 
119. See Hancock & Glass, supra note 38 (pointing out that the Court stated that remedial
orders must “concentrate on the elimination of the offending practice” and seems to suggest 
that cases of this type should not be subject to punitive sanctions). 
120. See Hancock & Glass, supra note 38 (suggesting that the remedial orders should not
include punitive sanctions. Punitive sanctions for discrimination would increase the financial 
risk for lenders). 
121. Kirchner, supra note 3.
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and to combat this concern, the Court said that when a defendant is found 
to have violated the FHA under the disparate impact theory, remedies 
must concentrate on eliminating the offending practice through “race 
neutral” means instead of punitive measures.122  This limitation should 
eliminate concerns of racial quotas and the risk of punishing defendants 
for unintentional discrimination.123  The standard should protect lenders 
from expensive damages awarded to punish the defendant and allow 
lenders to focus on appropriate remedies to the real issue—disparate 
impact of lending policies on protected classes. 
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE LIMITATIONS ON DISPARATE IMPACT
LIABILITY 
Since Inclusive Communities, a number of cases have discussed 
these limitations under other provisions of the FHA,124 but very few under 
other fair lending causes of actions.125  In City of Los Angeles v. Wells 
Fargo & Co.,126 the plaintiff brought a disparate impact claim under 
another provision of the FHA.127  In dismissing the case, the U.S. District 
Court for the Central District of California adopted the test and held that 
the city failed to point to a specific policy that caused an artificial, 
arbitrary, or unnecessary barrier.128  Claims filed under ECOA and other 
fair lending cause of actions have not used Inclusive Communities 
standard129 as the court in Mora v. U.S. Bank N.A. seemed to follow the 
122. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
123. Id.
124. See City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:13-cv-09007-ODW(RZx),
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93451, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) (discussing Inclusive 
Communities ruling for a claim arising under § 3605); County of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 
No. 1.2014-cv-09548, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93380 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2015); City of Miami 
v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-24508-WPD, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15444 (11th Cir.
Fla. Sept. 1, 2015) (dismissed on standing grounds); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-cv-
3045, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111389 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2015).
125. See Merritt v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 5:09-cv-01179-JW, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 125284, at *58 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 17, 2015) (analyzing a fair lending cause of action but 
not applying the new standard set in Inclusive Communities). 
126. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:13-cv-09007-ODW(RZx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93451.
127. Id. at *14.
128. Peter Kang, Wells Fargo Dodges Lending Bias in Calif., Ill., LAW360 (July 17, 2015)
https://lawlibproxy2.unc.edu:2147/articles/680721/wells-fargo-dodges-lending-bias-suits-in-
calif-ill-. 
129. See Mora v. US Bank, CV1502436DDPAJWX, 2015 WL 6681169 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
2, 2015); Frederick v. Capital One Bank (USA), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125111 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 17, 2015) (The standard still followed in recent cases is: “To state a claim for disparate 
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old standard for disparate impact claims under ECOA.130 
A. Claims Brought Under Other Provisions of the FHA
The City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co. case is a great 
example of how this decision can be applied to lenders under other 
provisions of the FHA.  First, the court reaffirmed that to establish a prima 
facie case for disparate impact liability under the FHA, a plaintiff must 
point to a specific practice or policy that has “robustly caused”131 a 
disproportionately adverse impact on persons of a particular class.132 
Second, the court reaffirmed the need to examine these claims with care 
at the pleadings stage in order to protect defendants from being punished 
for racial imbalances that they did not create.133  Third, the court 
reaffirmed that disparate impact liability should only be used to remove 
barriers that are artificial, arbitrary, or unnecessary.134  Finally, but most 
importantly, the court applied the standard set in Inclusive Communities 
on a claim arguing a violation of a different provision under the FHA.135  
By doing this, the court reaffirmed that this decision can impact lenders 
involved in real estate-related transactions.136 
In City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., the plaintiff claimed 
that the defendant had violated the FHA by engaging in discriminatory 
and predatory lending practices that resulted in a disparate number of 
residential home foreclosures for minority borrowers.137  The plaintiff 
claimed that Wells Fargo violated § 3605 of the FHA relying on disparate 
impact theory with two of their lending practices: issuance of high-cost 
impact discrimination under . . . the ECOA a plaintiff must plead (1) the existence of 
outwardly neutral practices; (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons 
of a particular type produced by the defendant’s facially neutral acts or practices; and (3) facts 
demonstrating a causal connection between the specific challenged practice or policy and the 
alleged disparate impact.”). 
130. Mora, 2015 WL 6681169, at *11–12.
131. City of Los Angeles 2015 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 93451, at *18.
132. Id. at 15.
133. Id. at 18.
134. Id. at 26.
135. Id. at 14.
136. By using Inclusive Communities as the standard in a real estate-related transaction,
the Court reaffirmed this decision can impact lenders. See id. at 12. 
137. Id. at *2.
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and USFHA138 loans.139  During the case, the court granted the Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed by Wells Fargo140 and stated that the 
undisputed facts demonstrated that Wells Fargo did not violate the 
FHA.141  The court looked to Inclusive Communities to determine the 
standard for FHA disparate impact claims and applied its precedent 
accordingly.142  In addition, the court found that high-cost loans did not 
violate the FHA, because the statistical disparity was not sufficiently 
substantial or significant.143   
This finding was especially important, because the court 
recognized the prohibition against weighing the evidence at summary 
judgment but said that the Supreme Court’s guidance in Inclusive 
Communities precluded it and that the court must examine the claim with 
care at the pleading stage.144  After examining the claim with care, the 
court concluded that there was not enough evidence to support it but 
nevertheless held that the plaintiff failed to identify a specific policy that 
caused the statistical disparity.145  With respect to the USFHA loans, the 
court found that once again Wells Fargo did not violate the FHA, because 
the plaintiff’s claim did not take into consideration the benefits of 
USFHA loans.146  The court’s holding emphasized the importance of 
examining these claims with care at the pleading stage and noted that the 
claim would have been dismissed for failing to identify a specific practice 
that caused the disparity.147 
If the Inclusive Communities standard is consistently applied to 
claims under the FHA, then this opinion could end up being a benefit to 
the lenders.  Even faced with a potential increase in disparate impact 
claims, the requirements for a prima facie case under disparate impact is 
more stringent and the requirements for the defense of business necessity 
are easier to meet.148 
138. USFHA loans are United States Federal Housing Authority loans, which are
described as loans with higher risk features. See id. at *4. 
139. Id. at *5–6.
140. Id. at *12.
141. Id. at *24–25.
142. Id. at *25.
143. Id. at *26–27.
144. Id. at *32.
145. Id. at *25.
146. Id. at 11.
147. Id. at 12–13.
148. By placing new limitations on disparate impact claims, the Court made it more
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City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co. exemplifies the abuse 
that could arise from disparate impact claims. There, the judge 
admonished the plaintiff’s attorneys for taking an approach that would 
have actually hurt the very minority borrowers for whom they were 
advocating.149  This case reinforced many of the concerns noted in 
Inclusive Communities,150 particularly the Court’s statement, “[i]f the 
specter of disparate-impact litigation causes private developers to no 
longer construct or renovate housing units for low-income individuals, 
then the FHA would have undermined its own purpose as well as the free-
market system.”151  The Los Angeles attorneys decided to argue that the 
USFHA loans violated the FHA because it was one of the only violations 
not barred by the statute of limitations.152  A success by the L.A. lawyers 
would have been unfortunate for minority borrowers; USFHA loans help 
them overcome barriers like strict credit requirements and support them 
in attaining the money needed for a down payment.153  If disparate impact 
theory is used to challenge policies or practices that actually discriminate 
in a way that helps minority borrowers, the very purpose of allowing 
these types of claims is destroyed.154 
B. Claims Brought Under Other Fair Lending Causes of Actions
To date there have been few cases using the Inclusive 
Communities standard to analyze other fair lending causes of action. 
Claims arising under the ECOA applied the same standards as claims 
under the FHA before Inclusive Communities and might adopt this new 
standard going forward.155  In Mora v. U.S. Bank N.A,156 the plaintiff 
difficult for the plaintiff to make a prima facie case and it easier for the defendant to meet his 
burden when arguing business necessity. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive 
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2549–50 (2015). 
149. Kang, supra note 128.
150. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2524 (2015). 
151. Id.
152. City of Los Angeles 2015 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 93451, at *43–44.
153. Id. at *46.
154. Kang, supra note 128.
155. See Stohr, supra note 69 (assuming that because claims arising under the FHA and
ECOA before Inclusive Communities used the same standard, that ECOA claims will follow 
the standard set in Inclusive Communities). 
156. Mora v. US Bank, CV1502436DDPAJWX, 2015 WL 6681169 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2,
2015). 
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claimed the defendant violated the ECOA by discriminating against them 
as minority status borrowers.157  Instead of using the Inclusive 
Communities standard, the court looked back to the original standard used 
for both ECOA and FHA claims.158  The CFPB has maintained that the 
ECOA allows disparate impact claims and that they will continue to use 
it to fight discrimination.159  The recent uproar about abusive claims made 
by the CFPB may lead to a push for this narrower standard.160  As of now, 
though, it seems as if CFPB will use this ruling to support their position 
that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ECOA, but there is 
currently a debate as to whether courts should apply the more stringent 
Inclusive Communities standard set by the Supreme Court.161 
V. THE BEST WAYS FOR BANKS TO AVOID POTENTIAL LIABILITY FROM
DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS 
The holding in Inclusive Communities creates a more favorable 
standard for the lender to establish a defense, but it also opens the door 
for an increased number of disparate impact claims.  Given the recent fair 
lending cases, bankers are seemingly caught between trying to accurately 
price their credit products and avoid fair lending risk in providing access 
to credit.162  Bankers and experts at the ABA’s Regulatory Compliance 
Conference expressed four considerations that can help lenders navigate 
the murky waters of fair lending enforcement.163  The first consideration 
is for lenders to build a robust, data-driven fair lending compliance 
management system in order to help minimize potential liability.164  The 
second is for lenders to be aware of discretionary pricing, because it 
157. Id. at *1–2.
158. Id. at *2.
159. See Chris Bruce, Fair Lending: Supreme Court Ruling Sets Framework For
Disparate Impact Claims Under FHA, [2015] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 123 (June 26, 2015) 
(discounting the statistics created by the CFPB; the court will likely tighten the requirements 
on claims under ECOA as well). 
160. See H.R. 1737, 114th Cong. (2015) (assuming that because of the abusive use of
disparate impact claims arising under ECOA, the court is more likely to tighten the 
requirements on these type of claims as well). 
161. The CFPB has argued that this case supports disparate impact claims being
cognizable under the ECOA but also continue to argue that the old standard is applied to these 
type of claims. See Mora, 2015 WL 6681169, at *1. 
162. Evan Sparks, Four Tips for Threading the Fair Lending Needle, 107 A.B.A.
BANKING J. 49, 1 (2015). 
163. Id.
164. Id.
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establishes a presumption of discrimination.165 Third, lenders should 
monitor fair lending risks across all customer interactions, especially 
service, because discrimination does not always occur in the creation of 
loans.166  Fourth, lenders must accept that disparate impact claims are 
here to stay and track data accordingly.167  The last recommendation is 
especially important because of the increase in superficial analysis or 
faulty statistics.168  The safest option for a banking lender is to conduct 
their own data analysis to better defend themselves from these types of 
claims.169 
These recommendations will help better prepare banks to tackle 
the increasingly difficult task of avoiding fair lending discrimination.170  
Once banking lenders accept that disparate impact claims are here to stay, 
they can begin to prevent and combat these claims.  Moving forward, it 
will be important to monitor the impact Inclusive Communities has on 
other fair lending causes and how this new standard will impact disparate 
impact claims arising under different provisions of the FHA. 
BALLARD J. YELTON 
165. Id. at 2.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id.
170. Id.
